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Abstract:  We examine the relationship between attendance, uncertainty of outcome, and team 
quality in the National Hockey League.  Based on results from a reduced form model of 
attendance at 6054 regular season NHL games from 2005/06 to 2009/10, we find evidence that 
attendance increases when fans expect the home team to win by a large margin.  Attendance 
increases for home team underdogs, but the extent of that boost declines as the underdog status 
worsens.  An asymmetric relationship exists between expected game outcomes and attendance, 
suggesting the need for an expanded definition of the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis.    
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Introduction 
 
Simon Rottenberg (1956) suggested that attendance “is a negative function of the … dispersion 
of percentages of games won by the teams in the league (p. 246)” and adds in a footnote “the 
„tighter‟ the competition, the larger the attendance.(footnote 21, pp. 246)”  Large variability in 
the quality of the teams, or in other words poor competitive balance in a sports league, hurts 
attendance.  Rottenberg‟s conjecture has come to be known as the Uncertainty of Outcome 
Hypothesis (UOH) in the sports economics literature and is the subject of substantial body of 
research.  Zimbalist (2002) suggested that the competitive balance-attendance relationship 
should be the focus of competitive balance research, as understanding fans‟ perceptions of 
competitive balance (as reflected in the sensitivity of attendance to changes in different measures 
of competitive balance) was a key way to evaluate the usefulness of the ever expanding catalog 
of ways to measure competitive balance.  Humphreys and Watanabe (in press) survey the 
literature on the UOH and the analysis of competitive balance following Zimbalist‟s (2002) 
special issue of the Journal of Sports Economics on competitive balance.  They conclude that 
much of the subsequent research on competitive balance focused primarily on measurement 
issues, referred to as analysis of competitive balance (ACB) research, while relatively little 
research examined the effect of outcome uncertainty on consumer demand. 
In this paper we add to the literature formally testing the predictions of the UOH using 
game or match level data from sports leagues and betting market data to proxy for game outcome 
uncertainty.  We also argue that the standard interpretation of the UOH used in the literature, 
based on a strict reading of Rottenberg‟s (1956) conjecture misses much of the richness of 
decision making under uncertainty and fails to account for two important features of recent 
theoretical advances in decision making under uncertainty: the idea that expected losses are 
treated differently than expected gains, as specified in prospect theory (Kahenmann and Tversky, 
1979), and the idea that non-expected utility maximization characterizes many important aspects 
of decisions made under uncertainty (Starmer, 2000).  Previous empirical research into the 
relationship between game attendance and game outcome uncertainty has assumed a symmetric 
relationship between these two factors, implicitly forcing the effects of an unbalanced contest 
where the home team is expected to win to be the same as the effects of an unbalanced contest 
where the home team is expected to lose.  This assumption of asymmetry is incompatible with 
prospect theory, which predicts that expected losses would be viewed differently than expected   3 
wins, and with the idea of non-expected utility maximization, which implies the presence of non-
linear or even discontinuities in the expected game outcome-attendance relationship.  We 
estimate an empirical model that relaxes the assumption of a symmetric relationship between 
expected game outcomes and attendance.      
We investigate the determinants of attendance at National Hockey League (NHL) games 
over the course of five seasons, 2005/06 through 2009/10.  Our explanatory variables include the 
money line or odds betting line as the primary measure of game-specific uncertainty of outcome, 
as well as season to date performance indicators of both the home and visiting team and the 
previous season‟s winning percentage.   
We find strong evidence that hockey fans turn out in larger numbers to see games the 
home team is expected to win but also turn out in large numbers to see the home team as an 
underdog, consistent with models featuring non-expected utility maximization motives for 
decisions under uncertainty.  Unlike previous studies that use betting odds to calculate implied 
probabilities of a home team win and enter this variable non-linearly in regression models, we 
assume that fans view favored home teams and underdog home teams differently when making 
attendance decisions.  In these regards, our results contradict the traditional interpretation of the 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis.  Attendance is higher at games featuring good visiting teams, 
high scoring teams, and good defensive teams. Moreover, if penalties measure sloppy or violent 
play, the results here suggest fans are willing to forgive the home team for committing these 
transgressions, but if the visiting team is heavily penalized attendance suffers.  Consequently, we 




Literature Review: Betting Markets and Outcome Uncertainty 
 
We contribute to the growing literature that uses betting market data to capture outcome 
uncertainty in empirical studies of demand for live attendance at sporting events.  Many tests of 
the UOH develop uncertainty of outcome measures based on current team won-loss records or 
league standings.  We do not review this extensive literature; see Humphreys and Watanabe (in 
press) for a survey of this literature.  While complex functions of such variables can reflect   4 
outcome uncertainty under correctly specified methods, betting market based measures are more 
likely to reflect the outcome uncertainty perceived by bettors and book makers who have some 
skin in the game and thus have an economic incentive to accurately forecast game or match 
outcomes.  Deriving outcome uncertainty measures from won-los records and league tables 
requires a complex mapping of observed game or match outcomes into expectations; using 
betting market outcomes eliminates all the problems associated with this mapping and replaces 
this with a market based variable generated in markets known to be efficient aggregators of 
information about factors affecting the outcomes of sporting events (Sauer 1998).   
Although a number of previous studies test the UOH, a surprisingly small number use 
betting market data as outcome uncertainty proxies, and the results from this literature are mixed.  
Peel and Thomas (1988) first used betting market data to proxy for uncertainty of match outcome 
in their study of match attendance in the English Football League for the 1981/82 season.  In this 
seminal paper, odds from football betting markets were used to construct measures of the 
probability that the home team would win a match; this approach assumes that the higher the 
probability the home team wins, the lower the outcome uncertainty.  Peel and Thomas (1988) 
used a linear form for the outcome uncertainty measure in their empirical model and found that 
attendance increased with the home win probability.  This result did not support the UOH, as the 
positive relationship between outcome uncertainty implies that fans prefer to see matches with 
lower outcome uncertainty.  Peel and Thomas (1992) analyzed the relationship between match 
uncertainty and attendance in the English Football League for the 1986/87 season.  They again 
used betting odds to calculate implied win percentages for home teams; in this case, they entered 
the implied home win percentage in the empirical model in a non-linear fashion, using the home 
win percentage and the home win percentage squared as explanatory variables.  In this paper, 
Peel and Thomas (1992) find a U-shaped relationship between game outcome uncertainty and 
attendance, implying that more tickets are sold for matches where the home team is a large 
underdog or large favorite than for matches where outcome uncertainty is large.   
Knowles, Sherony and Haupert (1992) analyzed the relationship between game outcome 
uncertainty and attendance in Major League Baseball (MLB) over the 1988 season.  Like the 
previous research, they use betting odds data to construct measures of the probability that the 
home team will win the game and enter this variable into an attendance model non-linearly.  
Unlike the evidence from English football, they find an inverse-U or hump-shaped relationship   5 
between game outcome uncertainty and attendance, with a maximum effect at an implied home 
winning percentage of about 0.6; while this only offers weak support for the UOH, these results 
are consistent with the UOH, unlike the earlier results from English football.     
Welki and Zlatroper (1999) analyzed the relationship between attendance and game 
outcome uncertainty in National Football League (NFL) games in the 1986 and 1987 seasons.  
Betting markets for American football use point spreads rather than betting odds, so this paper 
uses the point spread as a measure of game outcome uncertainty and account for non-linearity in 
the uncertainty of outcome-attendance relationship in the standard way by adding a quadratic 
variable to the regression model.  The estimated relationship between game outcome uncertainty 
and attendance was positive and linear; the larger the point spread, the larger attendance, other 
things equal.  The estimated parameter on the quadratic point spread variable was not statistically 
significant.  This result is not consistent with the UOH.     
Forrest and Simmons (2002) analyzed the relationship between match uncertainty and 
attendance in English professional football in the 1997/98 season.  This paper builds on Peel and 
Thomas (1988, 1992) by correcting the calculation of home winning percentage for book maker 
over-round and also by taking into account inefficiencies in betting markets related to the size of 
the fan base of football teams.  They also construct a variable from betting odds data that is equal 
to one when the probability that the home team will win the match is 0.5, a match between teams 
with equal ability.  Despite this careful transformation of the betting odds data, Forrest and 
Simmons (2002) also find a U-shaped relationship between match uncertainty and attendance, 
contrary to the UOH. 
Forrest and Simmons (2002) advocated the use for forecasts of game outcomes as 
uncertainty measures and the use of betting market data to proxy for outcome uncertainty 
declined.  Owen and Weatherston (2004) analyzed Super 12 Rugby attendance and outcome 
uncertainty for 70 rugby matches, using betting odds data to generate implied win probabilities 
as a measure of outcome uncertainty.  Their uncertainty of outcome measure enters the model in 
a non-linear way.  Attendance was not associated with outcome uncertainty measures in this 
study.  Lemke, Leonard, and Tlhokwane (2009) analyzed outcome uncertainty and attendance in 
MLB using betting odds data to generate implied win probabilities as a measure of outcome 
uncertainty.   Their uncertainty of outcome measure enters the model in a non-linear way.  The 
results are contrary to the UOH, but supports previous results from English football; the   6 
relationship between outcome uncertainty and attendance is U-shaped, first falling with the 
probability that the home team will win the game and then rising after reaching a minimum at 
about a 54% probability that the home team wins the game.    
Coates and Humphreys (2010) analyzed attendance and outcome uncertainty in more 
than 5000 National Football League (NFL) games over the period 1985-2008.  Betting markets 
for American football use point spreads rather than betting odds, so this paper uses the point 
spread as a measure of game outcome uncertainty and takes the same basic approach as Welki 
and Zlatroper (1999).  Coates and Humphreys find an increasing relationship between game 
outcome uncertainty and attendance, contrary to the UOH.  Although the estimated sign on the 
point spread squared variable is negative, it is not significant at commonly used significance 
levels, so attendance strictly increases with the point spread, suggesting that demand for closely 
contested games does not increase.    
  The literature analyzing the relationship between game outcome uncertainty and game 
attendance features little consistency.  Studies of the same sport report divergent results, even 
when similar measures of game outcome uncertainty are used.  Some studies conclude that the 
relationship is U-shaped, implying that fans like games with certain outcomes, and others 
conclude that inverse-U shaped relationships exist, a result consistent with the UOH.  While 
many have explored the idea that problems with betting market data drive the inconsistent results 
in tests of the UOH and advocate the use of forecasting models and other complex functions of 
league standings and previous game outcomes instead of betting market data (Forrest, Simmons 
and Buriamo, 2005), we believe that expected outcome proxy variables derived from betting 
market data are better options than forecasts.  We posit that the reason for the inconsistent results 
in the literature stems from functional form assumptions implicit in the widespread use of linear 
and quadratic measures of game outcome uncertainty in previous empirical research, and not 
from problems with betting market data.  An expanded interpretation of the underlying 
consumer-theoretic decision can imply alternative functional forms for the relationship between 
game outcome uncertainty and attendance. 
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Reinterpreting the UOH 
 
Put simply, the UOH posits a positive relationship between the expected outcome of a sporting 
event and consumer demand for tickets to that event or for viewing that event on some sort of 
media, in a broader context; the “tighter” consumers anticipate a contest will be, the more 
expected utility generated by watching the contest, either live or through some media.  The 
theoretic basis for the UOH lies in models of consumer decision making under uncertainty.  The 
general practice in the empirical literature has been to assume a symmetric relationship between 
expected game outcomes and demand, which also implies a symmetric relationship between 
expected game outcomes and expected utility, since the increase in demand can be linked to 
preferences and utility.  This symmetric relationship can be motivated by standard models of 
expected utility like the seminal model developed by Friedman and Savage (1948). 
  However, recent advances in modeling consumer decisions under uncertainty suggest that 
the relationship between game outcome uncertainty and utility need not be symmetric.  
Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory, which predicts that consumers value 
expected losses differently than expected gains.  Under the assumption that consumer utility 
increases with wins in sporting events and decreases with losses in sporting events, prospect 
theory suggests that the expected utility generated by wins differs systematically from the 
expected dis-utility generated by losses, implying that the relationship between expected game 
outcomes and attendance when fans expect the home team to win might differ systematically 
from the relationship between expected game outcomes and attendance when fans expect the 
home team to lose.  We incorporate this into the empirical model estimated below. 
  In addition, recent research and experimental evidence indicates that many aspects of 
consumer choice under uncertainty cannot be explained by models of expected utility, and 
instead can be characterized by models that incorporate elements of non-expected utility 
maximization.  Starmer (2000) recently surveyed this literature.  While these models are 
complex, several can be applied to the relationship between expected game outcomes and 
demand.  For example, framing, the case where similar stochastic outcomes are viewed 
differently, has been shown to affect consumer decisions.  In the case of the relationship between 
expected game outcomes and demand, consider two alternative stochastic outcomes: an 
unexpected loss by a team expected to win a game, and unexpected win by a team expected to   8 
lose a game.  The unexpected loss will not generate any satisfaction for fans of the home team, 
while the unexpected win, like David over Goliath, could generate substantial satisfaction among 
fans of the home team.  Fans know that an unexpected upset win will generate additional utility, 
which could lead to increased demand for tickets to games where the home team is the underdog, 
other things equal.  Again, the presence of non-expected utility maximizing motives in the form 
of framing suggests that the relationship between expected game outcome and demand may not 
be symmetric.  We expand the empirical model to include framing effects associated with games 
where the home team is not expected to win in the empirical model developed below, under the 
assumption that framing effects lead to differences in demand for tickets to games the home team 




The data for this analysis comes from two basic sources.  Information on the outcome of 
games and seasons comes from the National Hockey League website and covers the seasons 
2005/06 through 2009/10.  The five seasons in the analysis all are after the lost lockout season of 
2004/05.  The money line betting data comes from is www.sportsinsights.com, a sports betting 
information site that collects and distributes betting data from three off shore, on-line sports 
books. The three sports books included in the Sports Insights data are BetUS.com, 
FiveDimes.com, and Caribsports.com.  These three on-line book makers have been in business 
for some time; BetUs.com was founded in 1994 and is the 6th largest on-line gaming site in the 
world; FiveDimes.com opened in 1998; Caribsports.com opened in 1997.  All three on-line 
sports books offer betting on sporting events and horse races world-wide as well as on-line 
versions of traditional table games like blackjack.   These three book makers typically report 
similar money line odds on NHL games and the odds reported by Sports Insights are the average 
money line odds across these three on-line book makers.  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for 
the variables in our analysis.   
The data includes every regular season game during this period with two exceptions.  A 
small number of games were played in several cities in Europe at the start of the 2006/07, 
2007/08, and 2008/09 seasons.  Teams paired off for two games with one designated home in the 
first and the other the home team in the second.  As these designations are both random and   9 
clearly unrelated to the home ice of either team, these games are not included in the attendance 
regressions.  The games do, however, contribute to team quality and performance variables that 
evolve through the season.  More is said about these variables below.  The second reason a small 
number of games are omitted is the lack of money line data.  The fifteen games played on 
October 5, 2005 are missing from the attendance regressions for this reason. After these 
exclusions, there remain 6054 games for the analysis.  Thirty-six percent (2160 of 6054) of the 
games are sell outs.  Consequently, we estimate the model using a censored regression model. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of (home) game attendance for games 
involving home team i against visiting team j of season s.  Three games have attendance over 
23,000, with the largest attendance being 71,217 at the first “NHL Winter Classic”, a game 
played outdoors in Ralph Wilson Stadium in Orchard Park, NY, on January 1, 2008, between the 
Buffalo Sabres and the Pittsburgh Penguins.  Omitting the three Winter Classic games from the 
analysis, the average attendance falls only by 17, to about 17,127.  The standard deviation of 
attendance falls by about 120 compared to the value 2715.4 reported in Table 1.   
The log attendance at a game is explained by several variables that capture the quality of 
the teams to that point in the season.  For each team, the winning percentage is calculated on all 
games that season played prior to the specific game.  Similarly, goals scored, goals allowed, and 
penalty minutes assessed are accumulated up through the previous game a team played, and 
averaged over those games.  These variables are constructed for each team, so that prior to each 
game the average goals scored, average goals allowed and average penalty minutes assessed 
through all the previous games are available to influence fan decisions on attendance.  We 
hypothesize that attendance will be greater the higher the winning percentage of the home team 
and the more goals scored per game by the home team.  We hypothesize that attendance will be 
lower the more goals allowed per game by the home team and the more penalty minutes per 
game the team accumulates.  Stewart et al., (1992) suggest that hockey clubs choose the level of 
violence to maximize profits. In their model, added violence reduces the team success on the ice, 
but compensates by attracting more fans and greater revenues. Coates, Battre, and Deutscher (in 
press) found no evidence that attendance increased with either penalty minutes or actual fights in 
the NHL, though they found weak evidence that attendance in the German Ice Hockey League 
was higher for clubs that committed more penalties.   10 
The betting line data warrants more discussion.  The money line can be either positive or 
negative, with the sign indicating favorite or underdog status.  If the money line sign is negative, 
the team is favored to win the game and the money line value indicates how much must be bet to 
win $100.  Given a negative sign, as the absolute value of the line increases, that team is a 
stronger favorite, more must be bet to get a $100 payout.   If the sign is positive, the team is an 
underdog and the money line value indicates the payout on a $100 bet.  The larger the value, the 
more the return on a $100 bet, hence the greater the underdog status of the club.  This 
asymmetric effect of rises in the value of the line led us to treating the line differently for 
favorites and underdogs.  Specifically, we define a variable called “home favorite” to be zero 
when the raw money line is positive and to be the absolute value of the money line when the 
money line is negative.  As this variable rises, the strength of the favorite status of the home team 
rises.  For the home underdog we define two variables.  The first is simply a dummy variable 
(home dog) equal to one when the home team is the underdog (raw money line is positive) and 
zero otherwise.  There are 1399 home underdogs, about 23% of the sample.  The second (home 
dog line) is zero when the actual money line is negative but is the value of the money line when 
it is positive.  Increases in this variable indicate a greater underdog status for the home team in 
that game. 
Coates and Humphreys (2010) and Forrest, et al. (2005) each found that attendance is 
greater the stronger is the favorite status of the home team.  We, therefore, hypothesize that our 
home favorite variable will have a positive coefficient.  Similarly, we expect the sign of home 
dog line to be negative.  The greater the underdog status of the home team, the lower will be the 
attendance.     
The regression model also includes dummy variables indicating the home team, the 
visiting team, and the season.  Home team dummy variables capture a variety of team specific 
effects including geography, strong winter sports traditions, city-size, and franchise tradition.  
Visiting team dummies address the strength of the following of a club including both the extent 
to which fans of the club travel to away games and the extent to which a club has a national or 
international following.  Season dummy variables capture several possible influences.  For 
example, the 2005/06 season was the first season after the season-long lockout.  One might 
expect attendance to have been down across the board as fans express disapproval for the lockout.  
The Winter Olympics occurred in February of 2006 causing a long break in the season.  What   11 
effect that might have had is unclear. A similar break occurred in February of 2010 when the 
Winter Olympics were in Vancouver, one of the NHL cities.  The season variables also control 
for broad macroeconomic influences. 
We also estimated the model using day of the week dummy variables, a first home game 
of the season variable, a new arena indicator, and a control for intra-divisional games.  All but 
the same division dummy were statistically significant though their inclusion had no substantive 
effect on the coefficients of interest nor on the experiments with improved competitive balance.  
Consequently these results are not included but are available upon request. 
 
Results 
Table 2 reports estimation results for the main variables in our log attendance regression.  
A likelihood ratio test of the significance of the regression easily rejects the null hypothesis that 
all of the coefficients except the intercept are zero.  The McKelvey and Zavoina pseudo-R
2 is 
0.611. 
The coefficient estimates in Table 2 reveal that attendance this season will be greater the 
better the team performed last season, the more goals the team scores per game and the fewer 
goals it allows per game.  Curiously, the winning percentage of the team to this point in the 
season has a negative effect on attendance, though one that is not statistically significant.  
Attendance will also be greater the higher the winning percentage of the visiting team, the more 
goals per game scored by the visitors, and the fewer goals they allow.  Attendance is lower the 
greater the penalty minutes per game of the visiting team.  
The last column reports the elasticity of attendance with respect to the relevant variables, 
computed at the mean of the explanatory variable.  The most striking point regarding the 
elasticities is that they are all very small.  In other words, game attendance in the NHL is not 
particularly sensitive to any of the explanatory variables in our analysis.  The most significant 
influence, in terms of magnitude of effect, is the home underdog identifier.  A home underdog 
sees a boost of over 8% in its attendance, all other things constant, though this boost is mitigated 
somewhat the worse the home team is expected to fare. 
The largest impacts are generally for variables not reported here.  For example, the first 
home game of the season dummy variable exhibits about 22% greater attendance than other 
games during the season.  Attendance is significantly larger for Saturday games than for games   12 
on any other day.  Monday through Thursday games have about 10% lower attendance than 
Saturday games.  Teams with arenas five or fewer years old see a boost to attendance of about 
15%, all other things held equal. Including all of these variables raises McKelvy and Zavoina‟s 
pseudo-R
2 only by 0.05, from 0.611 to 0.662 
Table 3 shows the estimated home team effects.  Calgary and Vancouver are omitted as 
they sold out every game.  The Washington Capitals are also omitted as the basis of comparison 
for the other franchises.  Most of these team specific effects are individually significant, and the 
vast majority of them are significantly negative.  Traditional hotbed of hockey, Montreal, is one 
of the few home teams with statistically significantly more attendance than the Washington 
Capitals.  The New York Rangers, Edmonton Oilers, and Minnesota Wild are the others.  That 
the Wild are in this group is, perhaps, surprising given that Minnesota lost the North Stars in 
1993. 
Table 4 shows the visiting team effects, again with the Washington Capitals as the 
omitted category.  To the extent that these parameter estimates reflect the number of visiting 
team fans that travel to away games, the results do not indicate that a large number of fans 
engage in this type of travel. This result suggests that any economic impact associated with out 
of town fan spending on hotels, bars, restaurants, and other attractions is small.  Visiting teams 
with positive and statistically significant affects on home team attendance are the Anaheim 
Ducks, New York Rangers, Detroit Red Wings, Philadelphia Flyers, and Pittsburgh Penguins.  
By contrast, the Florida Panthers and Tampa Bay Lightning have statistically significant negative 
effects on home team attendance when they come to town. 
Forrest, et al. (2005) experimented with the impact that improved competitive balance 
would have on attendance.  Coates and Humphreys (2010) examined attendance under perfect 
competitive balance in the NFL.  Both of these prior studies found that complete competitive 
balance would result in a substantial reduction in attendance.  We extend this analysis to 
attendance at NHL games.  
Our approach is to set the money line to -105 for all games.  This means that to win $100 
on a bet on the home team, the bettor must risk $105.  This makes every game essentially a “pick 
„em” contest, as the $5 is the profit to the house on the bet.  We also set the winning proportion 
of each team to .5 and the goals for and against of the home and visiting teams are equal to the 
average values of those variables.   13 
Because our analysis covers multiple seasons, we can examine the difference from one 
season to the next in attendance under perfect balance compared to actual balance.  Doing this 
we see that predicted attendance is lower compared to actual attendance, on average, in every 
year of our data.  The smallest value, about 2000 fans per game, occurred in the 2005/06 season, 
the first post-lockout year.  In the other seasons, perfect balance corresponds to about 2300 to 
2500 fewer fans per game compared to the actual attendance. Over the full sample, the difference 
is about 2366 fans per game, or over 14 million in lost attendance over the sample had balance 
been complete.  The NHL as a whole would not benefit from improved attendance. 
A natural question is whether there are individual teams that would benefit from greater 
balance.  The answer is simple.  No teams would have better attendance on average if the NHL 
was perfectly balanced.  The range of lost attendance varies, from a few hundred to several 
thousand, and only the Washington Capitals‟ attendance is not statistically significantly smaller 
under perfect balance than it is under the actual level of balance.  The estimated difference is 193 
fewer fans per game for the Capitals with improved balance.  The smallest statistically 
significant difference is 462 fans per game for the New York Islanders.  On the other extreme, 
perfect balance would cost the Detroit Red Wings a statistically significant 4998 fans per game. 
Arena capacity is an issue in many of the games.  Recall that 36% of the games in the 
data are sell outs.  Forecasting attendance without the limit imposed by capacity, and imposing 
perfect balance, the results show that seven teams would experience increased attendance 
relative to their actual attendance.  The smallest increment is 116 additional fans per game at San 
Jose Sharks games, the largest increment is 5074 additional fans at New York Rangers games.  
In our data, the Rangers sold out 99% of their games.  The Vancouver Canucks, whose 
attendance would rise by 589 fans per game under complete balance and no seating capacity 
constraint, sold out every game in our data.   
By contrast, removing the capacity constraints but keeping the current level of balance 
would produce far more increases in attendance than would occur under perfect balance.  
Eighteen of the clubs would experience a statistically significant increase in per game attendance 
if there were no seating capacity constraint.  Most of these would see attendance rise in the 
thousands per game, led by Edmonton where attendance is predicted to rise by over 9000 per 
game.  The Rangers would sell an additional 7624 seats per game if there were no capacity 
constraint.  Half of the 18 teams in this group sell out 70% or more of their games.  Edmonton,   14 
Calgary, Vancouver, and the New York Rangers sell out essentially every game. The Rangers, 
Flames, and Oilers play in three of the six oldest facilities in the sample.  Calgary‟s is the 
youngest in this group at 25 years old in the 2008/09 season; the Oilers and Rangers play in 
facilities that are a decade or more older. 
 
Discussion 
The evidence here is consistent with the UOH under an expanded interpretation that includes 
both elements of loss aversion, as predicted by prospect theory, and framing effects that increase 
demand for tickets to games where the home team might pull off an upset.  Rather than simply 
preferring to see games where the outcome is highly uncertain, our results suggest that fans 
prefer to attend games the home team is expected to win, holding the prospect of seeing an upset 
victory constant and prefer to see a potential upset take place, other things equal.  The results 
indicate that a simple, symmetric relationship between expected game outcomes and attendance 
cannot capture the complex interaction of loss aversion and framing, and potentially other factors 
affecting consumer decisions under uncertainty that influence the relationship between demand 
and expected game outcomes.   
The evidence that demand responds to framing effects supports a strict reading of 
Rottenberg‟s (1956) UOH.  Only underdogs can pull off an unexpected victory, and in closely 
contested games, the home team will sometimes be the underdog.  Framing effects suggest that 
fans will understand that unexpected victories will generate substantial utility, and respond to 
this by demanding more tickets to games where the home team is the underdog, other things 
equal.  
This complex relationship between expected game outcomes and demand suggests that 
the UOH as interpreted in much of the empirical literature needs to be reworked.  While demand 
for tighter games may be higher, other things equal, a large number of factors must be held 
constant for this relationship to emerge, and a significant body of theoretical research developed 
over the past thirty years indicates that some things should not be held constant in this setting.  
An expanded theory of outcome uncertainty that explicitly incorporates decision making under 
uncertainty and key features of these decisions like loss aversion, and other elements of non-
expected utility maximization would go a long way toward improving our understanding of the 
expected game outcome-attendance relationship.        15 
The evidence here also gives support to the NHL‟s belief that fans want to see high 
scoring games.  Higher goals per game of both the home and the visiting team lead to increased 
attendance.  But attendance is harmed by poor defense by either team.  Attendance is also hurt by 
penalties, especially by the visiting team.  To the extent penalties reflect violent or excessively 
physical play, this result suggests the NHL was right in trying to cut down on these events.  
  Finally, our results say nothing about television viewership.  It may be that fans watching 
at home are more likely to turn on a game expected to be close than a game expected to be a 
blowout.  It is also possible that fans turn off games when the outcome seems no longer in doubt.  
Certainly many fans leave live sporting events before the game is over and it would be 
interesting to know how extensive this is and how large the scoring margin has to be to induce 
this behavior.  From the business side, however, fans leaving the live game early are largely 
irrelevant as an expression of demand and the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis as the club 
already has their ticket revenue in hand.  There may be lost concessions as a result of early 
departures, but this is surely a relatively small sum given how late in the game most of these 
must occur.     16 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Game Attendance  17144.04  2715.398  5410  71217 
Log Attendance  9.736  0.170  8.596  11.173 
Home favorite line  128.5192  86.14693  0  598 
     No zeros (N=4655)  167.1439     56.5231  101  598 
Home underdog line  30.81896  58.05648  0  422 
     No zeros (N=1399)  133.3653      30.12951  100  422 
Home underdog dummy  0.231087  0.421563  0  1 
Previous season win %  39.855  7.938  20  58 
Current season win % to date  53.233  16.964  0  200 
Home goals scored per game to date  2.948  0.438  0.5  6 
Home goals allowed per game to date  2.933  0.466  0  5.5 
Penalty minutes per game to date  13.894  2.890  0  31 
Visiting team win % to date  52.683  16.757  0  200 
Visiting team goals scored per game to date  2.947  0.495  0.833  6 
Visiting team goals allowed per game to date  2.960  0.537  0.5  8.5 
Visiting team penalty minutes per game to date  13.965  3.120  0  46 
Home team's game number  42.114  23.326  2  82 
Game number squared  2317.609  2023.634  4  6724 
Game sold out  0.357  0.479  0  1 
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Table 2: Censored Attendance Regression 
Variable  Coefficient   Std. Err.  p-value  elasticity 
Home favorite line  0.0005  0.0001  0.000  0.070 
Home underdog line  -0.0005  0.0002  0.001  -0.017 
Home underdog dummy  0.0806  0.0231  0.000 
  Previous season win %  0.0033  0.0004  0.000  0.133 
Current season win % to date  -0.0005  0.0002  0.057  -0.024 
Home goals scored per game to date  0.0564  0.0081  0.000  0.166 
Home goals allowed per game to date  -0.0592  0.0079  0.000  -0.174 
Penalty minutes per game to date  -0.0008  0.0011  0.468  -0.011 
Visiting team win % to date  0.0007  0.0002  0.004  0.036 
Visiting team goals scored per game to date  0.0226  0.0072  0.002  0.067 
Visiting team goals allowed per game to date  -0.0271  0.0075  0.000  -0.080 
Visiting team penalty minutes per game to date  -0.0023  0.0010  0.026  -0.032 
Home team's game number  0.0008  0.0005  0.071 
  Game number squared  0.0000  0.0000  0.193 
 
 
        Observations  6054 
      Log likelihood  885.90 
      Likelihood ratio χ
2 (74)  4572. 
      p-value  0.0000 
      McKelvey & Zavoina's pseudo R
2          0.611 
           20 
Table 3: Home team effects 
 
Coefficient  Std.Err.  t-stat  p-value 
ANA  -0.268  0.015  -18.08  0.000 
ATL  -0.284  0.014  -19.80  0.000 
BOS  -0.202  0.015  -13.63  0.000 
BUF  -0.078  0.016  -4.81  0.000 
CAR  -0.253  0.015  -17.03  0.000 
CBJ  -0.241  0.015  -16.41  0.000 
CHI  -0.220  0.014  -15.31  0.000 
COL  -0.195  0.015  -13.11  0.000 
DAL  -0.180  0.015  -12.15  0.000 
DET  -0.052  0.018  -2.85  0.004 
EDM  0.248  0.056  4.45  0.000 
FLA  -0.254  0.014  -17.64  0.000 
LAK  -0.104  0.015  -6.99  0.000 
MIN  0.044  0.019  2.33  0.020 
MTL  0.195  0.019  10.47  0.000 
NJD  -0.354  0.015  -23.09  0.000 
NSH  -0.364  0.015  -24.00  0.000 
NYI  -0.390  0.014  -27.12  0.000 
NYR  0.194  0.035  5.47  0.000 
OTT  -0.140  0.015  -9.40  0.000 
PHI  -0.051  0.014  -3.52  0.000 
PHX  -0.321  0.014  -22.55  0.000 
PIT  -0.148  0.015  -9.98  0.000 
SJS  -0.090  0.019  -4.63  0.000 
STL  -0.171  0.014  -11.85  0.000 
TBL  -0.101  0.014  -7.03  0.000 
TOR  -0.027  0.015  -1.83  0.068 
 
Washington Capitals is the omitted category.  Vancouver and Calgary are omitted because they 
sold out every game. 
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Table 4: Visiting team effects 
 
Coefficient  Std.Err.  t-stat  p-value 
ANA  0.039  0.019  2.10  0.036 
ATL  -0.024  0.017  -1.43  0.153 
BOS  0.020  0.017  1.19  0.233 
BUF  0.006  0.017  0.38  0.705 
CAR  -0.011  0.017  -0.65  0.518 
CBJ  -0.024  0.018  -1.35  0.178 
CGY  0.022  0.018  1.23  0.218 
CHI  0.031  0.018  1.71  0.087 
COL  0.029  0.018  1.59  0.112 
DAL  0.021  0.018  1.19  0.233 
DET  0.149  0.019  7.94  0.000 
EDM  0.002  0.017  0.11  0.912 
FLA  -0.057  0.017  -3.45  0.001 
LAK  0.005  0.018  0.26  0.792 
MIN  0.002  0.018  0.09  0.930 
MTL  0.018  0.017  1.07  0.283 
NJD  0.021  0.018  1.22  0.222 
NSH  -0.023  0.018  -1.31  0.190 
NYI  -0.017  0.017  -1.01  0.313 
NYR  0.081  0.017  4.77  0.000 
OTT  -0.025  0.017  -1.44  0.150 
PHI  0.042  0.017  2.42  0.015 
PHX  -0.022  0.018  -1.24  0.214 
PIT  0.083  0.017  4.81  0.000 
SJS  0.024  0.018  1.33  0.183 
STL  -0.012  0.018  -0.70  0.483 
TBL  -0.039  0.017  -2.30  0.021 
TOR  0.010  0.017  0.59  0.558 
VAN  0.021  0.018  1.16  0.247 
 
Washington Capitals is the omitted category.   